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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic
behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following the-
orem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate n votes i.i.d. according to
a distribution π, and let n go to infinity, then for any ǫ > 0, with probability
at least 1 − ǫ, the minimum number of operations that are needed for the
strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four
categories: (1) 0, (2) Θ(
√
n), (3) Θ(n), and (4) ∞. This theorem holds for
any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution π, and any inte-
ger generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all
commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring
rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin,
Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs.
We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall un-
der our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive/destructive
manipulation, bribery, and control by adding/deleting votes, margin of vic-
tory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem
naturally applies to these problems.
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operations
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1. Introduction
Voting is a popular method used to aggregate voters’ preferences to make
a joint decision. Recently, voting has been used in many fields of artifi-
cial intelligence, for example in multi-agent systems [15], recommender sys-
tems [21, 32], and web-search engines [12]. One of the most desired proper-
ties for voting rules is strategy-proofness, that is, no voter has incentive to
misreport her preferences to obtain a better outcome of the election. Unfor-
tunately, strategy-proofness is not compatible with some other desired prop-
erties, due to the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [22, 36], which
states that when there are at least three alternatives, no strategy-proof vot-
ing rule satisfies the following two natural properties: non-imposition (every
alternative can win) and non-dictatorship (no voter is a dictator, whose top
ranked alternative is always selected to be the winner).
Even though manipulation is inevitable, researchers have set out to in-
vestigate whether computational complexity can serve as a barrier against
various types of strategic behavior, including manipulation. The idea is, if we
can prove that it is computationally too costly for a strategic individual to
find a beneficial operation, she may give up doing so. Initiated by Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [2], a fair amount of work has been done to characterize the
computational complexity of various types of strategic behavior1, including
the following.
•Manipulation: a voter or a coalition of voters cast false vote(s) to change
the winner (and the new winner is more preferred).
• Bribery: a strategic individual changes some votes by bribing the voters
to make the winner preferable to her [16]. The bribery problem is closely
related to the problem of computing the margin of victory [5, 25, 47].
• Control: a strategic individual adds or deletes votes to make the winner
more preferable to her [3].
Most previous results studying “using computational complexity as a bar-
rier against strategic behavior” conduct worst-case analyses of computational
complexity. Recently, an increasing number of results show that manipu-
lation, as a particular type of strategic behavior, is typically not hard to
compute. One direction, mainly pursued in the theoretical computer science
community, is to obtain a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem, showing that for any given voting rule that is “far” enough from any
1See [19, 17, 35] for recent surveys.
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dictatorships, an instance of manipulation can be found easily with high prob-
ability. This line of research was initiated by Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan [20],
where they proved the theorem for 3 alternatives and neutral voting rules.
The theorem was extended to an arbitrary number of alternatives by Isaks-
son, Kindler, and Mossel [23], and finally, the neutrality constraint was re-
moved by Mossel and Racz [27]. Other extensions include Dobzinski and
Procaccia [11] and Xia and Conitzer [49].
Another line of research is to characterize the “frequency of manipulabil-
ity”, defined as the probability for a randomly generated preference-profile
to be manipulable by a group of manipulators, where the non-manipulators’
votes are generated i.i.d. according to some distribution (for example, the
uniform distribution over all possible types of preferences). Peleg [31], Ba-
harad and Neeman [1], and Slinko [37, 38] studied the asymptotic frequency
of manipulability for positional scoring rules when the non-manipulators’
votes are drawn i.i.d. uniformly at random. Procaccia and Rosenschein [34]
showed that for positional scoring rules, when the non-manipulators votes
are drawn i.i.d. according to some distribution that satisfies some natural
conditions, if the number of manipulators is o(
√
n), where n is the number
of non-manipulators, then the probability that the manipulators can succeed
goes to 0 as n goes to infinity; if the number of manipulator is ω(n), then
the probability that the manipulators can succeed goes to 1.
This dichotomy theorem was generalized to a class of voting rules called
generalized scoring rules (GSRs) by Xia and Conitzer [48]. A GSR is defined
by two functions f, g, where f maps each vote to a vector in multidimensional
space, called a generalized scoring vector (the dimensionality of the space is
not necessarily the same as the number of alternatives). Given a profile P ,
let total generalized scoring vector be the sum of f(V ) for all votes V in P .
Then, g selects the winner based on the total preorder of the components of
the total generalized scoring vector. We call a GSR an integer GSR, if the
components of all generalized scoring vectors are integers. (Integer) GSRs
are a general class of voting rules. One evidence is that many commonly
studied voting rules are integer GSRs, including (but not limited to) approval
voting, all positional scoring rules (which include Borda, plurality, and veto),
plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs.2
2The definition of these commonly studied voting rules can be found in, e.g., [48]. In
this paper, we define GSRs as voting rules where the inputs are profiles of linear orders.
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As another evidence, GSRs admit a natural axiomatic characterization [50],
which also suggests that GSRs are equivalent to hyperplane rules [26]. The
knife-edge case of Θ(
√
n) was studied experimentally for STV and veto in [45],
showing that the probability for the manipulators to succeed has a smooth
phase transition. More recently, [26] extends the dichotomy theorem to all
anonymous voting rules for distributions that satisfy some mild conditions,
and theoretically proved that for all generalized scoring rules, for the knife-
edge case, the probability that the manipulators can achieve their goal is
continuously differentiable, which suggests a smooth phase transition.
While most of the aforementioned results are about manipulation, in this
paper, we focus the optimization variants of various types of strategic be-
havior, including manipulation, bribery, and control. Despite being natural,
to the best of our knowledge, such optimization variants have been investi-
gated for only three types of strategic behavior. The first is the unweighted
coalitional optimization (UCO) problem, where we are asked to compute the
minimum number of manipulators who can make a given alternative win [53].
Approximation algorithms have been proposed for UCO for specific voting
systems, including positional scoring rules and maximin [53, 51, 52]. The
second is the margin of victory problem, where we are asked to compute
the smallest number of voters who can change their votes to change the
winner [25, 5, 47]. The third is the minimum manipulation coalition size
problem, which is similar to the margin of victory, except that all voters who
change their votes must prefer the new winner to the old winner [33].
1.1. Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce a unified framework to study a class of strate-
gic behavior for generalized scoring rules, which we call vote operations. In
our framework, a strategic individual seeks to change the winner by apply-
ing some operations, which are modeled as vectors in a multidimensional
space. We study three goals of the strategic individual: (1) making a fa-
vored alternative win, called constructive vote operation (CVO), (2) making
a disfavored alternative lose, called destructive vote operation (DVO), and
(3) change the winner of the election, called change-winner vote operation
(CWVO). The framework will be formally defined in Section 3. This is our
main conceptual contribution.
GSRs can be easily generalized to include other types of voting rules where the inputs are
not necessarily linear orders, for example, approval voting.
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Our main technical contribution is the following asymptotical characteri-
zation of the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic
individual to achieve her goal.
Theorem 1 (informally put) Fix the number of alternatives and the set of
vote operations. For any integer generalized scoring rule and any distribution
π over votes, we generate n votes i.i.d. according to π and let n go to infinity.
Then, for any VO ∈ {CVO,DVO,CWVO} and any ǫ > 0, with probability
at least 1 − ǫ, the minimum number of operations that are necessary for
the strategic individual to achieve VO falls into one of the following four
categories: (1) 0, (2) Θ(
√
n), (3) Θ(n), and (4) ∞.
More informally, Theorem 1 states that in large elections, to achieve a
specific goal (one of the three goals described above), with probability that
can be infinitely close to 1 the strategic individual needs to either do nothing
(the goal is already achieved), apply Θ(
√
n) vote operations, apply Θ(n) vote
operations, or the goal cannot be achieve no matter how many vote operations
are applied. This characterization holds for any integer generalized scoring
rule, any set of vote operations, and any distribution π for individual votes.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the Central Limit Theorem and on
sensitivity analyses for the integer linear programmings (ILPs). It works as
follows. We will formulate each of the strategic individual’s three goals as
a set of ILPs in Section 4. By applying Central Limit Theorem, we show
that with probability that goes to 1 the random generated preference-profile
satisfies a desired property. Then, for each such preference-profile we apply
the sensitivity analyses in [8] to show that with high probability the number
of operations that are necessary is either 0, Θ(
√
n), Θ(n), or ∞.
While Theorem 1 may look quite abstract, we show later in the paper
that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our vote oper-
ation framework, including constructive/destructive manipulation, bribery,
and control by adding/deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum ma-
nipulation coalition size.3 Therefore, we naturally obtain corollaries of Theo-
rem 1 for these types of strategic behavior. The theorem also applies to other
types of strategic behavior, for example the mixture of any types mentioned
above, which is known as multimode control attacks [18].
3We defer the definition of these types of strategic behavior to Section 6.
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1.2. Related Work and Discussion
Our main theorem applies to any integer generalized scoring rule for de-
structive manipulation, constructive and destructive bribery and control by
adding/deleting votes. To the best of our knowledge, no similar results were
obtained even for specific voting rules for these types of strategic behavior.
Three previous papers obtained similar results for manipulation, margin of
victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. The applications of our
main theorem to these types of strategic behavior are slightly weaker, but
we stress that our main theorem is significantly more general.
Three related papers. First, the dichotomy theorem in [48] implies that,
(informally) when the votes are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution, with
probability that goes to 1 the solution to constructive and destructive UCO
is either 0 or approximately
√
n for some favored alternatives. However,
this result only works for the UCO problem and some distributions over the
votes.
Second, it was proved in [47] that for any non-redundant generalized
scoring rules that satisfy a continuity condition, when the votes are drawn
i.i.d. and we let the number of voters n go to infinity, either with probability
that can be arbitrarily close to 1 the margin of victory is Θ(
√
n), or with
probability that can be arbitrarily close to 1 the margin of victory is Θ(n).
It is easy to show that for non-redundant voting rules, the margin of victory
is never 0 or ∞. Though it was shown in [47] that many commonly studied
voting rules are GSRs that satisfy such continuity condition, in general it is
not clear how restrictive the continuity condition is. More importantly, the
result only works for the margin of victory problem.
Third, in [33], the authors investigated the distribution over the mini-
mum manipulation coalition size for positional scoring rules when the votes
are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution. However, it is not clear how
their techniques can be extended beyond the uniform distributions and posi-
tional scoring rules, which are a very special case of generalized scoring rules.
Moreover, the paper only focused on the minimum manipulation coalition
size problem.
Our results has both negative and positive implications. On the negative
side, our results provide yet another evidence that computational complex-
ity is not a strong barrier against strategic behavior, because the strategic
individual now has some information about the number of operations that
are needed, without spending any computational cost or even without look-
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ing at the input instance. Although the estimation of our theorem may not
be very precise (because we do not know which of the four cases a given
instance belongs to), such estimation may be explored to designing effective
algorithms that facilitate strategic behavior. On the positive side, this eas-
iness of computation is not always a bad thing: sometimes we want to do
such computation in order to test how robust a given preference-profile is.
For example, computing the margin of victory is an important component in
designing novel risk-limiting audit methods [25, 5, 47, 39, 40, 42, 41, 43].
While being quite general, our results have two main limitations. First,
they are asymptotical results, where we fix the number of alternatives and
let the number of voters go to infinity. We do not know the convergence rate,
or equivalently, how many voters are needed for the observation to hold. In
fact, this is a standard setting in previous work, especially in the studies of
“frequency of manipulability”. We feel that our results work well in settings
where there are small number of alternatives and large number of voters,
e.g., political elections. Second, our results show that with high probability
one of the four cases holds (0, Θ(
√
n), Θ(n), ∞), but we do not know which
case holds more often. We will briefly discuss this issue in Appendix B. It
is possible to refine our study for specific voting rules and specific types of
strategic behavior that fall under our framework, which we leave as future
work.
1.3. Structure of the Paper
After recalling basic definitions of voting and generalized scoring rules,
we present the framework in Section 3, where we define vote operations as
well as the strategic individual’s objectives. Then, in Section 4 we formulate
the optimization problem for the strategic individual as a set of integer linear
programmings (ILPs). The main theorem will be presented in Section 5. To
show the wide application of the framework and the main theorem, we show
that many commonly studied types of strategic behavior can be modeled as
vote operations for generalized scoring rules in Section 6, which means that
our main theorem naturally applies to these cases. We add some discussions
and point out some future directions in Section 7 and Appendix B. Some
proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
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2. Preliminaries
Let C denote the set of alternatives (or candidates), |C| = m. We assume
strict preference orders. That is, a vote is a linear order over C. The set of all
linear orders over C is denoted by L(C). A preference-profile P is a collection
of n votes for some n ∈ N, that is, P ∈ L(C)n. Let L(C)∗ = ⋃∞n=1 L(C)n.
A voting rule r is a mapping that assigns to each preference-profile a single
winner. That is, r : L(C)∗ → C. Throughout the paper, we let n denote the
number of votes and let m denote the number of alternatives.
We now recall the definition of generalized scoring rules (GSRs) [48]. For
any K ∈ N, let OK = {o1, . . . , oK}. A total preorder (preorder for short)
is a reflexive, transitive, and total relation. Let Pre(OK) denote the set of
all preorders over OK . For any ~p ∈ RK , we let Ord(~p) denote the preorder
D over OK where ok1 D ok2 if and only if pk1 ≥ pk2 . That is, the k1-th
component of ~p is as large as the k2-th component of ~p. For any preorder
D, if o D o′ and o′ D o, then we write o =D o
′. Each preorder D naturally
induces a (partial) strict order ⊲, where o ⊲ o′ if and only if o D o′ and
o′ 4 o.
Definition 1 Let K ∈ N, f : L(C) → RK and g : Pre(OK) → C. f
and g determine a generalized scoring rule (GSR) GS(f, g) as follows. For
any preference-profile P = (V1, . . . , Vn) ∈ L(C)n, abusing the notation we
let f(P ) =
∑n
i=1 f(Vi), and let GS(f, g)(P ) = g(Ord(f(P ))). We say that
GS(f, g) is of order K. If f(V ) ∈ ZK holds for all V ∈ L(C), then we call
GS(f, g) an integer GSR.
For any V ∈ L(C), f(V ) is called a generalized scoring vector, f(P ) is called a
total generalized scoring vector, and Ord(f(P )) is called the induced preorder
of P . The class of integer GSRs is equivalent to the class of rational GSRs,
where the components of each generalized scoring vector is in Q, because for
any l > 0, GS(f, g) = GS(l · f, g).
Almost all commonly studied voting rules are generalized scoring rules,
including (but not limited to) approval voting, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin,
plurality with runoff, ranked pairs, and multi-stage voting rules that use
GSRs in each stage to eliminate alternatives (including Nanson’s and Bald-
win’s rule). As an example, we recall the proof from [48] that the single
transferable vote (STV) rule (a.k.a. instant-runoff voting or alternative vote
for single-winner elections) is an integer generalized scoring rule.
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Example 1 STV selects the winner in m rounds. In each round, the al-
ternative that gets the lowest plurality score (the number of times that the
alternative is ranked in the top position) drops out, and is removed from all
of the votes (so that votes for this alternative transfer to another alterna-
tive in the next round). Ties are broken alphabetically. The last-remaining
alternative is the winner.
To see that STV is an integer GSR, we will use generalized scoring vectors
with many components. For every proper subset S of alternatives, for every
alternative c outside of S, there is a component in the vector that contains
the number of times that c is ranked first if all alternatives in S are removed.
Let
• KSTV =
∑m−1
i=0
(
m
i
)
(m− i); the components are indexed by (S, j), where S
is a proper subset of C and j ≤ m, cj /∈ S.
• (fSTV (V ))(S,j) = 1, if after removing S from V , cj is at the top; otherwise,
let (fSTV (V ))(S,j) = 0.
• gSTV selects the winners based on D as follows. In the first round, let
j1 be the index such that o(∅,j1) is ranked the lowest in D among all o(∅,j)
(if there are multiple such j’s, then we break ties alphabetically to select the
least-preferred one). Let S1 = {cj1}. Then, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, define
Si recursively as follows: Si = Si−1 ∪ {cji}, where ji is the index such that
o(Si−1,ji) is ranked the lowest in D among all o(Si−1,j); finally, the winner is
the unique alternative in (C \ Sm−1).
GSRs admit a natural axiomatic characterization [50]. That is, GSRs are
the class of voting rules that satisfy anonymity, homogeneity, and finite local
consistency. Anonymity says that the winner does not depend on the name
of the voters, homogeneity says that if we duplicate the preference-profile
multiple times, then the winner does not change, and finite local consistency
is an approximation to the well-studied consistency axiom. Not all voting
rules are GSRs, for example, Dodgson’s rule is not a GSR because it violates
homogeneity [4], and the following skewed majority rule is also not a GSR
because it also violates homogeneity.
Example 2 For any 1
2
< γ < 1, the γ-majority rule is defined for two
alternatives {a, b} as follows: b is the winner if and only if the number of
voters who prefer b is more than the number of voters who prefer a by at least
nγ.
Admittedly, these γ-majority rules are quite artificial. Later in this paper we
will see that the observation made for GSRs in our main theorem (Theorem 1)
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does not hold for γ-majority rules for any 1
2
< γ < 1. Notice that these rules
satisfy anonymity, which means that the observation made in Theorem 1
cannot be extended to all anonymous voting rules.
3. Vote Operations
All types of strategic behavior mentioned in the introduction share the
following common characteristics. The strategic individual (who can be a
group of manipulators, a briber, or a controller, etc.) changes the winner
by changing the votes in the preference-profile. Therefore, for generalized
scoring rules, any such an operation can be uniquely represented by changes
in the total generalized scoring vector. This is in contrast to some other
types of strategic behavior where the strategic individual changes the set of
alternatives or the voting rule [3, 44].
In this section, we first define the set of operations the strategic individual
can apply, then define her goals. Given a generalized scoring rule of order K,
we model the strategic behavior, called vote operations, as a set of vectors,
each of which has K elements, representing the changes made to the total
generalized scoring vector if the strategic individual applies this operation.
We focus on integer vectors in this paper.
Definition 2 Given a GSR GS(f, g) of order K, let ∆ = [~δ1 · · ·~δT ] denote
the vote operations, where for each i ≤ T , ~δi ∈ ZK is a column vector that
represents the changes made to the generalized scoring vector by applying the
i-th vote operation. For each l ≤ K, let ∆l denote the l-th row of ∆.
We will show examples of these vote operations for some well-studied
types of strategic behavior in Section 6. Given the set of available operations
∆, the strategic individual’s behavior is characterized by a vector ~v ∈ NT≥0,
where ~v is a column vector and for each i ≤ T , vi represents the number of i-th
operation (corresponding to ~δi) that she applies. Let ‖~v‖1 =
∑T
i=1 vi denote
the total number of operations in ~v, which is the L1-norm of ~v. It follows
that ∆ ·~v is the change in the total generalized scoring vector introduced by
the strategic individual, where for any l ≤ K, ∆l · ~v is the change in the l-th
component.
Next, we give definitions of the strategic individual’s three goals and the
corresponding computational problems studied in this paper.
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Definition 3 In the constructive vote operation (CVO) problem,
we are given a generalized scoring rule GS(f, g), a preference-profile P , a
favored alternative c, and a set of vote operations ∆ = [~δ1 · · ·~δT ], and we are
asked to compute the smallest number k, denoted by CVO(P, c), such that
there exists a vector ~v ∈ NT≥0 with ‖~v‖1 = k and g (Ord(f(P ) + ∆ · ~v)) = c.
If such ~v does not exist, then we denote CVO(P, c) =∞.
The destructive vote operation (DVO) problem is defined simi-
larly, where c is the disfavored alternative, and we are asked to compute the
smallest number k, denoted by DVO(P, c), such that there exists a vector
~v ∈ NT≥0 with ‖~v‖1 = k and g (Ord(f(P ) + ∆ · ~v)) 6= c.
In the change-winner vote operation (CWVO) problem, we are
not given c and we are asked to compute DVO(P,GS(f, g)(P )), denoted by
CWVO(P ).
In CVO, the strategic individual seeks to make c win; in DVO, the strategic
individual seeks to make c lose; and in CWVO, the strategic individual seeks
to change the current winner.
For a given instance (P, r), CWVO is a special case of DVO, where
c = GS(f, g)(P ). We distinguish these two problems because in this paper,
the input preference-profiles are generated randomly, so the winners of these
preference-profiles might be different. Therefore, when the preference-profiles
are randomly generated, the distribution for the solution to DVO does not
immediately give us a distribution for the solution to CWVO.
4. The ILP Formulation
Let us first put aside the strategic individual’s goal for the moment (i.e.,
making a favored alternative win, making a disfavored alternative lose, or
changing the winner) and focus on the following question: given a preference-
profile P and a preorder D over the K components of the generalized scoring
vector, that is, D∈ Pre(OK), how many vote manipulations are needed to
change the order of the total generalized scoring vector to D? Formally,
given a GS(f, g), a preference-profile P and D∈ Pre(OK), we are interested
in min{‖~v‖1 : ~v ∈ NK≥0,Ord(f(P ) + ∆ · ~v) =D}.
This can be computed by the following integer linear programming ILPD,
where vi represents the ith component in ~v, which must be a nonnegative
integer. We recall that ∆l denotes the l-th row vector of ∆.
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min ‖~v‖1
s.t. ∀oi =D oj : (∆i −∆j) · ~v = [f(P )]j − [f(P )]i
∀oi ⊲ oj : (∆i −∆j) · ~v ≥ [f(P )]j − [f(P )]i + 1
∀i : vi ≥ 0
(LPD)
Now, we take the strategic individual’s goal into account. We immediately
have the following lemma as a warmup, whose proofs are straightforward and
are thus omitted.
Lemma 1 Given a GSR GS(f, g), an alternative c, and a preference-profile
P ,
• CVO(P, c) < ∞ if and only if there exists D such that g(D) = c and
LPD has an integer solution;
• DVO(P, c) < ∞ if and only if there exists D such that g(D) 6= c and
LPD has an integer solution;
• CWVO(P ) < ∞ if and only if there exists D such that g(D) 6=
GS(f, g)(P ) and LPD has an integer solution. (We do not need the input
c for this problem.)
Moreover, the solution to each of the three problems is the minimum objective
value in all LPs corresponding to the problem. For example, if CVO(P, c) <
∞, then
CVO(P, c) = min‖~v‖1{~v is the solution to some LPD where g(D) = c}
5. The Main Theorem
In this section we prove the main theorem, which states that for any
fixed m, any generalized scoring rules, and any set of vote operations ∆, if n
votes are generated i.i.d., then for CVO (respectively, DVO, CWVO), with
probability that can be infinitely close to 1, the solution is either 0, Θ(
√
n),
Θ(n), or ∞.
We first present a simple example for the majority rule for two alternatives
{a, b} to show the taste of the proof for a very special case, and then comment
on why this idea cannot be extended to GSRs. After the proof of Theorem 1
we will add more comments on the non-triviality of proof.
Example 3 Suppose there are n voters, whose votes are drawn i.i.d. from
a distribution π over all possible votes (i.e., voting for a with probability
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π(a) and voting for b with probability π(b), w.l.o.g. π(a) ≥ π(b)). Let Ya
(respectively, Yb) denote random variable that represents the total number of
voters for a (respectively, for b). The number of manipulators that are needed
to make b to win (i.e., the solution to the UCO problem, see Section 6.1
for formal definition) is thus a random variable Ya − Yb.4 Let X denote
the random variable that takes 1 with probability π(a) and takes −1 with
probability π(b). It follows that Ya−Yb = X + · · ·+X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. By the Central Limit
Theorem, Ya−Yb converges to a normal distribution with mean n ·E(X) and
variance n · Var(X).
We are interested in usually how large is Ya − Yb. Not surprisingly, the
answer depends on the distribution π. If π(a) = π(b) = 1/2, then the mean
of Ya − Yb is zero, and the probability that it is a few standard deviations
away from the mean is small. For example, the probability that its absolute
value is larger than 4
√
n · Var(X) is less than 0.01, which means that with
99% probability the solution of UCO is no more than 4
√
n · Var(X). On
the other hand, if π(a) > π(b), then the mean of Ya − Yb is n(π(a) − π(b)),
which means that with high probability the solution of UCO is very close to
n(π(a)− π(b)) = Θ(n).
The idea behind the argument in Example 3 can be easily extended to posi-
tional scoring rules [34]. However, we do not believe that it can be extended
to generalized scoring rules, even for the case of manipulation, for the fol-
lowing two reasons. First, for generalized scoring rules, the components of
the generalized scoring vector do not correspond to the “scores” of alterna-
tives. Therefore, having two components tied in the total generalized scoring
vector does not mean that two alternatives are tied. Second, the conditions
for an alternative to win can be much more complicated than the condition
for positional scoring rules, which amounts to requiring that a corresponding
component of the total generalized scoring vector is the largest. Therefore,
it is not easy to figure out whether the manipulators can achieve their goal
by just knowing the asymptotic relationship between the components of the
total generalized scoring vector.
Theorem 1 Let GS(f, g) be an integer generalized scoring rule, let π be a
distribution over all linear orders, and let ∆ be a set of vote operations.
4If Ya − Yb < 0 then no manipulator is needed.
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Suppose we fix the number of alternatives, generate n votes i.i.d. according
to π, and let Pn denote the preference-profile. Then, for any alternative c,
VO ∈ {CVO,DVO,CWVO5}, and any ǫ > 0, there exists β∗ > 1 such that
as n goes to infinity, the total probability for the following four events sum
up to more than 1 − ǫ: (1) VO(Pn, c) = 0, (2) 1β∗
√
n < VO(Pn, c) < β
∗
√
n,
(3) 1
β∗
n < VO(Pn, c) < β
∗n, and (4) VO(Pn, c) =∞.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let f(Pπ) =
∑
V ∈L(C) π(V ) · f(V ), and Dπ=
Ord(f(Pπ)). We first prove the theorem for CVO, and then show how to
adjust the proof for DVO and CWVO. The theorem is proved in the fol-
lowing two steps. Step 1: we show that as n goes to infinity, with proba-
bility that goes to one we have the following: in a randomly generated Pn,
the difference between any pair of components in f(Pn) is either Θ(
√
n) or
Θ(n). Step 2: we apply sensitivity analyses to ILPs that are similar to the
ILP given in Section 4 to prove that for any such preference-profile and any
VO ∈ {CVO,DVO,CWVO}, VO(Pn, c) is either 0, Θ(
√
n), Θ(n), or ∞.
The idea behind Step 2 is, for any preference-profile Pn, if the difference be-
tween a pair of components in f(Pn) is Θ(
√
n), then we consider this pair of
components (not alternatives) to be “almost tied”; if the difference is Θ(n),
then we consider them to be “far away”. Take CVO as an example, we can
easily identify the cases where CVO(Pn, c) is either 0 (when GS(f, g) = c) or
∞ (by Lemma 1). Then, we will first try to break these “almost tied” pairs
by using LPs that are similar to LPD introduced in Section 4, and show that
if there exists an integer solution ~v, then the objective value ‖~v‖1 is Θ(
√
n).
Otherwise, we have to change the orders between some “far away” pairs by
using LPD’s, and show that if there exists an integer solution to some LPD
with g(D) = c, then the objective value is Θ(n).
Formally, given n ∈ N and β > 1, let Pβ denote the set of all n-vote
preference-profiles P that satisfy the following two conditions (we recall that
f(Pπ) =
∑
V ∈L(C) π(V ) · f(V )): for any pair i, j ≤ K,
1. if [f(Pπ)]i = [f(Pπ)]j then
1
β
√
n < |[f(P )]i − [f(P )]j| < β
√
n;
2. if [f(Pπ)]i 6= [f(Pπ)]j then 1βn < |[f(P )]i − [f(P )]j| < βn.
The following lemma was proved in [47], which follows after the Central
Limit Theorem.
5When VO = CWVO, we let VO(Pn, c) denote CWVO(Pn).
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Lemma 2 For any ǫ > 0, there exists β such that limn→∞ Pr (Pn ∈ Pβ) >
1− ǫ.
For any given ǫ, in the rest of the proof we fix β to be a constant guaran-
teed by Lemma 2. The next lemma (whose proof is deferred to the appendix)
will be frequently used in the rest of the proof.
Lemma 3 Fix an integer matrix A. There exists a constant βA that only
depends on A, such that if the following LP has an integer solution, then the
solution is no more than βA · ‖~b‖∞.
min ‖~x‖1, s.t. A · ~x ≥ ~b
To prove that with high probability CVO(Pn, c) is either 0, Θ(
√
n), Θ(n),
or ∞, we introduce the following notation. A preorder D′ is a refinement of
another preorder D, if ⊲′ extends ⊲. That is, ⊲⊆⊲′. We note that D is a
refinement of itself. Let D′ ⊖ D denote the strict orders that are in ⊲′ but
not in ⊲. That is, (oi, oj) ∈ (D′ ⊖ D) if and only if oi ⊲′ oj and oi =D oj .
We define the following LP that is similar to LPD defined in Section 4, which
will be used to check whether there is a way to break “almost tied” pairs of
components to make c win. For any preorder D and any of its refinement D′,
we define LPD′⊖D as follows.
min ‖~v‖1
s.t. ∀oi =D′ oj : (∆i −∆j) · ~v = [f(P )]j − [f(P )]i
∀(oi, oj) ∈ (D′ ⊖ D) : (∆i −∆j) · ~v ≥ [f(P )]j − [f(P )]i + 1
∀i : vi ≥ 0
(LPD′⊖D)
LPD′⊖D is defined with a little abuse of notation because some of its
constraints depend on D (not only the pairwise comparisons in (D′ ⊖ D
)). This will not cause confusion because we will always indicate D in the
subscript. We note that there is a constraint in LPD′⊖D for each pair of
components oi, oj with oi =D oj . Therefore, LPD′⊖D is used to find a solution
that breaks ties in D. It follows that LPD′⊖D has an integer solution ~v if and
only if the strategic individual can make the order between any pairs of oi, oj
with oi =D oj to be the one in D
′ by applying the i-th operation vi times,
and the total number of vote operations is ‖~v‖1.
The following two claims identify the preference-profiles in Pβ for which
CVO is Θ(
√
n) and Θ(n), respectively, whose proofs are deferred to the
appendix.
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Claim 1 There exists N ∈ N and β ′ > 1 such that for any n ≥ N , any
P ∈ Pβ, if (1) c is not the winner for P , and (2) there exists a refinement
D∗ of Dπ= Ord(f(Pπ)) such that g(D
∗) = c and LPD∗⊖Dpi has an integer
solution, then 1
β′
√
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′
√
n.
Claim 2 There exists β ′ > 1 such that for any P ∈ Pβ, if (1) c is not the
winner for P , (2) there does not exist a refinement D∗ of Dπ= Ord(f(Pπ))
such that LPD∗⊖Dpi has an integer solution, and (3) there exists D such that
g(D) = c and LPD has an integer solution, then
1
β′
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′n.
Lastly, for any P ∈ Pβ such that GS(f, g)(P ) 6= c, the only case not
covered by Claim 1 and Claim 2 is that there does not existD with GS(f, g)(D
) = c such that LPD has an integer solution. It follows from Lemma 1 that
in this case CVO(P, c) =∞. We note that β ′ in Claim 1 and Claim 2 does
not depend on n. Let β∗ be an arbitrary number that is larger than the two
β ′s. This proves the theorem for CVO.
For DVO, we only need to change g(D∗) = c to g(D∗) 6= c in Claim 1,
and change g(D) = c to g(D) 6= c in Claim 2. For CWVO, CWVO(P ) is
never 0 and we only need to change g(D∗) = c to g(D∗) 6= GS(f, g)(P ) in
Claim 1, and change g(D) = c to g(D) 6= GS(f, g)(P ) in Claim 2. 
More comments on the non-triviality of the proof. Lemma 2 has been
proved in [47], whose intuition is quite straightforward and naturally corre-
sponds to a random walk in multidimensional space. However, we did not
find an obvious connection between random walk theory and the observation
made in Theorem 1. We believe that it is unlikely that an obvious connection
exists. One evidence is that the observation made in Theorem 1 does not
hold for some voting rules. For example, consider the γ-majority rule defined
in Example 2. It is not hard to see that as n goes to infinity, with probability
that goes to 1 we have CVO(Pn, b) = DVO(Pn, a) = CWVO(Pn) = n
γ/2,
which is not any of the four cases described in Theorem 1 if 1
2
< γ < 1. (This
implies that for any 1
2
< γ < 1, γ-majority is not a generalized scoring rule,
which we already know because they do not satisfy homogeneity.) Therefore,
the proof of Theorem 1 should involve analyses on the specific structure of
GSRs.
The main difficulty in proving Theorem 1 is, for generalized scoring rules
we have to handle the cases where some components of the total generalized
scoring vector are equivalent. This only happens with negligible probability
for the randomly generated preference-profile Pn, but it is not clear how
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often the strategic individual can make some components equivalent in order
to achieve her goal. This is the main reason for us to convert the vote
manipulation problem to multiple ILPs and apply Lemma 3 to analyze them.
6. Applications of the Main Theorem
In this section we show how to apply Theorem 1 to some well-studied
types of strategic behavior, including constructive and destructive unweighted
coalitional optimization, bribery and control, and margin of victory and min-
imum manipulation coalition size. In the sequel, we will use each subsection
to define these problems and describe how they fit in our vote operation
framework, and how Theorem 1 applies. In the end of the section we present
a unified corollary for all these types of strategic behavior.
6.1. Unweighted Coalitional Optimization
Definition 4 In a constructive (respectively, destructive) unweighted coali-
tional optimization (UCO) problem, we are given a voting rule r, a
preference-profile PNM of the non-manipulators, and a (dis)favored alter-
native c ∈ C. We are asked to compute the smallest number of manipu-
lators who can cast votes PM such that c = r(PNM ∪ PM) (respectively,
c 6= r(PNM ∪ PM)).
To see how UCO fits in the vote operation model, we view the group of
manipulators as the strategic individual, and each vote cast by a manipulator
is a vote operation. Therefore, the set of operations is exactly the set of all
generalized scoring vectors {f(V ) : V ∈ L(C)}. To apply Theorem 1, for
constructive UCO we let VO = CVO and for destructive UCO we let
VO = DVO.
6.2. Bribery
In this paper we are interested in the optimization variant of the bribery
problem [16].
Definition 5 In a constructive (respectively, destructive) opt-bribery prob-
lem, we are given a preference-profile P and a (dis)favored alternative c ∈ C.
We are asked to compute the smallest number k such that the strategic indi-
vidual can change no more than k votes such that c is the winner (respectively,
c is not the winner).
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To see how opt-bribery falls under the vote operation framework, we
view each action of “changing a vote” as a vote operation. Since the strategic
individual can only change existing votes in the preference-profile, we define
the set of operations to be the difference between the generalized scoring
vectors of all votes and the generalized scoring vectors of votes in the support
of π, that is, {f(V )− f(W ) : V,W ∈ L(C) s.t. π(W ) > 0}. Then, similarly
the constructive variant corresponds to CVO and the destructive variant
corresponds to DVO. In both cases Theorem 1 cannot be directly applied,
because in the ILPs we did not limit the total number of each type of vote
operations that can be used by the strategic individual. Nevertheless, we can
still prove a similar proposition by taking a closer look at the relationship
between CVO (DVO) and opt-bribery as follows: For any preference-
profile, the solution to CVO (respectively, DVO) is a lower bound on the
solution to constructive (respectively, destructive) opt-bribery, because in
CVO and DVO there are no constraints on the number of each type of vote
operations. We have the following four cases.
1. If the solution to CVO (DVO) is 0, then the solution to constructive
(destructive) opt-bribery is also 0.
2. If the solution to CVO (DVO) is Θ(
√
n), as n become large enough,
with probability that goes to 1 each type of votes in the support of π will
appear Θ(n), which is > Θ(
√
n), times in the randomly generated preference-
profile, which means that there are enough votes of each type for the strategic
individual to change.
3. If the solution to CVO (DVO) is Θ(n), then the solution to construc-
tive (destructive) opt-bribery is either Θ(n) (when the strategic individual
can change all votes to achieve her goal), or ∞.
4. If the solution to CVO (DVO) is∞, then the solution to constructive
(destructive) opt-bribery is also ∞.
It follows that the observation made in Theorem 1 holds for opt-bribery.
6.3. Margin of Victory (MoV)
Definition 6 Given a voting rule r and a preference-profile P , the margin
of victory (MoV) of P is the smallest number k such that the winner can be
changed by changing k votes in P . In the mov problem, we are given r and
P , and are asked to compute the margin of victory.
For a given instance (P, r), mov is equivalent to destructive opt-bribery,
where c = r(P ). However, when the input preference-profiles are generated
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randomly, the winners in these profiles might be different. Therefore, the
corollary of Theorem 1 for opt-bribery does not directly imply a similar
corollary for mov. This relationship is similar to the relationship between
DVO and CWVO.
Despite this difference, the formulation of mov in the vote operation
framework is very similar to that of opt-bribery: The set of all operations
and the argument to apply Theorem 1 are the same. The only difference is
that for mov, we obtain the corollary from the CWVO part of Theorem 1,
while the corollary for opt-bribery is obtained from the CVO and DVO
parts of Theorem 1.
6.4. Minimum Manipulation Coalition Size (MMCS)
The minimum manipulation coalition size (MMCS) problem is
similar to mov, except that in MMCS the winner must be improved for all
voters who change their votes [33].
Definition 7 In an MMCS problem, we are given a voting rule r and a
preference-profile P . We are asked to compute the smallest number k such
that a coalition of k voters can change their votes to change the winner, and
all of them prefer the new winner to r(P ).
Unlike mov, MMCS falls under the vote operation framework in the
following dynamic way. For each preference-profile, suppose c is the cur-
rent winner. For each adversarial d 6= c, we use {f(V ) − f(W ) : V,W ∈
L(C) s.t. d ≻W c and π(W ) > 0} as the set of operations. That is, we only
allow voters who prefer d to c to participate in the manipulative coalition.
We also replace each of LPD and LPD∗⊖Dpi by multiple LPs, each of which is
indexed by a pair of alternatives (d, c) and the constraints are generated by
using the corresponding set of operations. Then, the corollary for MMCS
follows after a similar argument to that of CVO in Theorem 1.
6.5. Control by Adding/Deleting Votes (CAV/CDV)
Definition 8 In a constructive (respectively, destructive) optimal con-
trol by adding votes (opt-CAV) problem, we are given a preference-
profile P , a (dis)favored alternative c ∈ C, and a set N ′ of additional votes.
We are asked to compute the smallest number k such that the strategic indi-
vidual can add k votes in N ′ such that c is the winner (respectively, c is not
the winner).
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For simplicity, we assume that |N ′| = n and the votes in N ′ are drawn
i.i.d. from a distribution π′. To show how opt-CAV falls under the vote
operation model, we let the set of operations to be the generalized scoring
vectors of all votes that are in the support of π′, that is, {f(V ) : V ∈
L(C) and π′(V ) > 0}. Then, the corollary follows from the CVO and DVO
parts of Theorem 1 via a similar argument to the argument for opt-bribery.
Definition 9 In a constructive (respectively, destructive) optimal con-
trol by deleting votes (opt-CDV) problem, we are given a preference-
profile P and a (dis)favored alternative c ∈ C. We are asked to compute the
smallest number k such that the strategic individual can delete k votes in P
such that c is the winner (respectively, c is not the winner).
To show how opt-CDV falls under the vote operation framework, we let the
set of operations to be the negation of generalized scoring vectors of votes in
the support of π′, that is, {−f(V ) : V ∈ L(C) and π′(V ) > 0}. Then, the
corollary follows from the CVO and DVO parts of Theorem 1 via a similar
argument to the argument for opt-bribery.
6.6. A Unified Corollary
The next corollary of Theorem 1 summarizes the results obtained for all
types of strategic behavior studied in this section.
Corollary 1 For any integer generalized scoring rule, any distribution π
over votes, and any X ∈ ({constructive, destructive}×{UCO, opt-bribery,
opt-CAV, opt-CDV})∪{MoV, MMCS}, suppose the input preference-
profiles are generated i.i.d. from π.6 Then, for any alternative c and any
ǫ > 0, there exists β∗ > 1 such that the total probability for the solution to X
to be one of the following four cases is more than 1− ǫ as n goes to infinity:
(1) 0, (2) between 1
β∗
√
n and β∗
√
n, (3) between 1
β∗
n and β∗n, and (4) ∞.
7. Discussions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a general framework to study vote operations
for generalized scoring rules. Our main theorem is a characterization for
6For CAV, the distribution over the new votes can be generated i.i.d. from a different
distribution pi′.
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the number of vote operations that are needed to achieve the strategic in-
dividual’s goal. We showed that the main theorem can be applied to many
types of strategic behavior and many commonly used voting rules, for most
of which no similar results were previously known. We further discuss the
generality of our framework in the next two paragraphs.
GSRs vs. integer GSRs. Though integer GSRs are a subclass of GSRs,
we feel that from a computational point of view, focusing integer generalized
scoring rules does not sacrifice much generality. Because the g function only
depends on the preorder among components in the total generalized scoring
vector, if the f function is scaled up by a constant, then the g function will
select the same winner. Therefore, integer GSRs are equivalent to GSRs
where components in the generalized scoring vectors are rational numbers.
When the components are irrational numbers, two computational problems
arise. First, it is not clear how these irrational numbers are represented,
and second, it is hard to compare two irrational numbers computationally,
thus even harder to compute the preorder of the components of the total
generalized scoring vector. On the other hand, integer GSRs do not have
such computational constraints. In fact, all commonly studied voting rules
that are known to be GSRs are integer GSRs. Therefore, we believe that
our main theorem has a wide application (at least can be applied to many
commonly studied voting rules).
On the generality of vote operations. While the framework we proposed
covers many types of strategic behavior, some other types of strategic behav-
ior that have been widely studied are not covered by our framework. These
types of strategic behavior can be roughly categorized as follows: (1) controls
that changes the set of alternatives, for example, control by adding/deleting
alternatives [3] and control by introducing clones of alternatives [44, 13];
and (2) controls that change the procedure of voting, for example control
by (runoff) partition of alternatives and control by partition of voters [3],
and control by changing the agenda of voting [24]. Building a more general
framework that covers more types of strategic behavior and studying their
properties are interesting directions for future research.
As we discussed in the introduction, on the positive side, our main theo-
rem suggests that computing the margin of victory is usually not hard, which
helps implementing efficient post-election auditing methods. One promising
future direction is to design practical computational techniques for comput-
ing the margin of victory for generalized scoring rules, based on the ILP
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proposed in this paper. On the negative side, our main theorem suggests
that computational complexity might merely be a weak barrier against many
types of strategic behavior. Therefore, we should look for new ways to pro-
tect voting, for example introducing randomization [6, 14, 46, 29, 30], using
multiple rounds [9, 28, 10], or limiting the strategic individuals’ information
about other voters [7]. Another interesting research direction is to investigate
the phase transition of the probability for a coalition of strategic individuals
to achieve their goal by using vote operations, as it was done for manipula-
tion [45, 26].
Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 3 Fix an integer matrix A. There exists a constant βA that only
depends on A, such that if the following LP has an integer solution, then the
solution is no more than βA · ‖~b‖∞.
min ‖~x‖1, s.t. A · ~x ≥ ~b (A.1)
Proof of Lemma 3: Let A be a m∗×n∗ integer matrix, which includes the
constraints ~x ≥ ~0. Suppose LP (A.1) has a (non-negative) integer solution.
We note that ~0 is an optimal integer solution to min~1 · (~x)′ s.t. A · ~x ≥ ~0.
Then, it follows from Theorem 5 (ii) in [8] that LP (A.1) has a (non-negative)
integer solution ~z such that
‖~z −~0‖∞ ≤ n∗ ·M(A) · (‖~b−~0‖∞ + 2),
where M(A) is the maximum of the absolute values of the determinants of
the square sub-matrices of A. Since A is fixed, the right hand side becomes a
constant, that is, ‖~z‖∞ = O(‖~b‖∞). Therefore, there exists βA such that the
optimal value in the ILP (A.1) is no more than ~1 ·(~z)′ ≤ n∗‖~z‖∞ ≤ βA ·‖~b‖∞.

Claim 1 There exists N ∈ N and β ′ > 1 such that for any n ≥ N , any
P ∈ Pβ, if (1) c is not the winner for P , and (2) there exists a refinement
D∗ of Dπ= Ord(f(Pπ)) such that g(D
∗) = c and LPD∗⊖Dpi has an integer
solution, then 1
β′
√
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′
√
n.
Proof of Claim 1: Let D= Ord(f(P )). Because GS(f, g)(P ) 6= c, g(D
) 6= c. Therefore, the strategic individual has to change the order of some
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components in the generalized scoring vector to make c win. We note that
P ∈ Pβ , which means that the difference between any pair of components
of f(P ) is more than 1
β
√
n. Let dmax denote the maximum difference be-
tween any pair of components in generalized score vectors. That is, dmax =
maxt,t′,L∈L(C){(f(L))t − (f(L))t′}. In order for c to win, the number of vote
operations must be at least 1
β
√
n/dmax. Therefore, CVO(P, c) >
1
βdmax
√
n.
We next show the upper bound. Because P ∈ Pβ , for any pair oi, oj
with oi =Dpi oj, |[f(P )]i − [f(P )]j| < β
√
n. Therefore, the right hand side of
each (in)equality in LPD∗⊖Dpi is no more than β
√
n. Applying Lemma 3 to
LPD∗⊖Dpi , we have that there exists a constant βD∗,Dpi that only depends on
D∗ and Dπ, and an integer solution ~v with ‖~v‖1 ≤ βD∗,Dpi
√
n (the A matrix
in Lemma 3 is fixed because we fix the number of alternatives m, and the
left hand side of each (in)equality in LPD∗⊖Dpi does not depend on n). Let
β ′ be the maximum of dmaxβ and all βD∗,Dpi (since we fix the number of
alternatives, there are finite many βD∗,Dpi ’s). Since βD∗,Dpi >
1
dmaxβ
, β ′ > 1.
It follows that ‖~v‖1 < β ′
√
n. We next show that for a sufficiently large n,
if the strategic individual applies ~v, then the order over components of the
total scoring vector will become D∗. That is, c can be made win.
The idea is, LPD∗⊖Dpi ensures that by applying ~v, ties between the “almost
tied” components are broken as in D∗. Since ‖~v‖1 = O(
√
n), when n is large
enough the order between any pair of “far away” components will not be
affected. Formally, let ~x = f(P ) + ∆ · ~v. That is, ~x is the total generalized
scoring vector after the strategic individual applied ~v. Because ~v is a solution
to LPD∗⊖Dpi , for any pair oi, oj with oi =Dpi oj, the order between oi and oj
in D∗ is the same as the order between oi and oj in Ord(~x). Since D
∗ is an
extension of Dπ, if oi ⊲π oj , then we must have oi ⊲
∗ oj. Therefore, we only
need to check that for any oi ⊲π oj, we have [~x]i > [~x]j . Because P ∈ Pβ ,
|[f(P )]i − [f(P )]j| > 1βn. We note that ‖~v‖1 < β ′
√
n, which means that by
applying ~v, the strategic individual can only change the difference between
any pair of components by no more than dmaxβ
′
√
n. Let N = (dmaxβ
′β)2+1.
When n ≥ N , dmaxβ ′
√
n < 1
β
n, which means that for any oi ⊲π oj , applying
~v will not change the order between oi and oj in the total generalized scoring
vector. This means that by applying ~v, the strategic individual can make c
win. Therefore, CVO(P, c) ≤ ‖~v‖1 < β ′
√
n. It follows that for any n ≥ N ,
1
β′
√
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′
√
n. 
23
Claim 2 There exists β ′ > 1 such that for any P ∈ Pβ, if (1) c is not the
winner for P , (2) there does not exist a refinement D∗ of Dπ= Ord(f(Pπ))
such that LPD∗⊖Dpi has an integer solution, and (3) there exists D such that
g(D) = c and LPD has an integer solution, then
1
β′
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′n.
Proof of Claim 2: Let D= Ord(f(P )). Because the premises of Claim 1
do not hold, the strategic individual has to change the order of some pair
of components that are “far away” (that is, the difference between them is
Θ(n) before the strategic individual applies vote operations) to make c win.
We note that one operation can only change the difference between a pair of
components by at most dmax. Therefore, CVO(P, c) ≥ 1βn/dmax.
On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 1 and condition (3) in the
statement of the claim that CVO(P, c) < ∞. The only thing left to show
is that there exists β ′ > 1 such that CVO(P, c) < β ′n for all P ∈ Pβ and
for all n. Because P ∈ Pβ , for any pair oi, oj , |[f(P )]i − [f(P )]j| < βn.
Applying Lemma 3 to LPD and condition (3) in the statement of the claim,
we have that for any D, there exits βD that only depends on D, and an
optimal integer solution ~v such that ‖~v‖1 ≤ βDn. Let β ′ be the maximum
of dmaxβ and all βD (again, there are finite number of βD’s). It follows that
1
β′
n < CVO(P, c) < β ′n. 
Appendix B. Discussion: How often the solution is 0 or ∞?
One important question is: how large is the probability that the solution
to problems studied in this section is 0 or ∞? Not surprisingly the answer
depends on both the voting rule and the type of vote operations. The prob-
ability can be large for some voting rules. For example, for any voting rule
that always selects a given alternative d as the winner, the solution to CVO
(respectively, DVO) is always 0 (respectively ∞) for c = d and is always ∞
(respectively 0) for c 6= d. However, for common voting rules the alternatives
are treated almost equally (except for cases with ties). Therefore, we may
expect that for a preference-profile whose votes are generated i.i.d., each al-
ternative has almost the same probability of being selected as the winner.
This is indeed the case in all commonly used voting rules, including approval
voting, all positional scoring rules (which include Borda, plurality, and veto),
plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs.
Therefore, for these voting rules, when the votes are drawn i.i.d. uniformly
at random, the probability for CVO is approximately 1
m
and the probability
24
for DVO is approximately m−1
m
. For CWVO, the answer is never 0 because
changing 0 votes cannot change the winner.
We would also expect for common voting rules, for some types of strategic
behavior studied in this section, with low probability the solution is ∞. For
UCO, the strategic individual can introduce many (but finitely many) votes
such that the non-manipulators’ votes are negligible. For opt-bribery and
mov, the strategic individual can change all votes to achieve her goal. For
MMCS, CAV, and CDV, it is not clear how large such probability is. The
following table summarizes folklore results for common voting rules when
votes are drawn i.i.d. uniformly at random.
Optimal solution is 0 ∞
{Cons.} × {uco, opt-bribery} ≈ 1
m
0
{Des.} × {uco, opt-bribery} ≈ m−1
m
0
mov 0 0
Table B.1: Probability for solutions to some problems to be 0 or ∞ for common voting
rules.
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